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Informing Climate Policy Given Incommensurable Benefits Estimates
Henry D. Jacoby*
Abstract
The determination of long-term goals for climate policy, or of near-term mitigation effort,
requires a shared conception among nations of what is at stake. Unfortunately, because of
different attitudes to risk, problems of valuing non-market effects, and disagreements about
aggregation across rich and poor nations, no single benefit measure is possible that can
provide commonly accepted basis for judgment. In response to this circumstance, a portfolio of
estimates is recommended, including global variables that can be represented in probabilistic
terms, regional impacts expressed in natural units, and integrated monetary valuation.
Development of such a portfolio is a research task, and the needed program of work suggested.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nations face a continuing struggle to formulate an appropriate response to the threat of
climate change, and underlying the resulting policy debates are assessments of benefit and
costs—sometimes explicit, but more often implicit. What level of restriction of human emissions
is called for, given our understanding of the value of climate impacts avoided? What actions are
justified to ease adaptation to change that we may experience in any event? Responses to such
questions may reflect the viewpoint of one country, or they may be intended to represent a group
like Annex B, or the sum of all nations. They may incorporate uncertainty in different ways, and
include different assumptions about future behavior as it influences the benefits of action today.
                                                 
*
 MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change (hjacoby@mit.edu). This article was prepared for
an OECD Workshop on “The Benefits of Climate Policy: Improving Information for Policymakers,” held in
Paris, 12-13 December 2002.
2But, however it is formulated, any recommendation of limits on human influence in the long
term, or of the level of current effort, implies a weighing-up of the benefits expected, for
comparison with the costs to be borne. An ability to communicate about perceived benefits thus
is essential for authorities seeking a common response to the threat of human-caused change.
They need some shared conception of what is at stake in the choice of one level of effort or
another, and a common terminology for incorporating these considerations into international
negotiations and domestic decision-making.
One approach to meeting this need would be to seek a single estimation procedure, with all
benefits converted to a common monetary unit, to allow direct comparison with estimates of the
costs of control. Unfortunately, the complexities of the climate issue combine to rule against the
formulation of a single, widely accepted measure of this type. Inevitably, governments will be
confronted with sets of benefits estimates that are incommensurable—i.e., they will share no
common basis for comparison. To deal with this difficulty, it is recommended here that efforts
focus on the development of a portfolio of benefits measures, structured to provide transparency
when viewing alternative estimates. The development of such a portfolio is a research task, and
an effort is made below to outline the work needed.
To limit the scope of this discussion several important issues are laid aside. Most important,
the “benefits” considered here are limited to the damage caused by climate change (net of any
positive effects) that could be prevented by emissions mitigation. The accounting for adaptation
costs, which arises mainly in the context of monetary estimates, are not treated in detail. It is
simply assumed that estimates of climate damage (or the benefits of avoiding it) include the
effects and costs of economic adaptation. Secondary or ancillary benefits of mitigation actions
also are not considered. This last omission is an important one, for many of the issues raised
about (net) climate damage apply as well to ancillary benefits and costs. And, although
distributional issues will emerge, the discussion does not pretend to cover the range of concerns
of developing countries or of sustainable development more broadly. Again, these issues are
important, but they as well only add more dimensions to the problem of incommensurability
explored here.
Finally, by maintaining the benefits focus of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) inquiry, problems of cost estimation are overlooked. Given this limited
scope, it is worth mentioning that the estimation of costs, of both mitigation efforts and
adaptation measures, raises many of the same problems discussed here. Simple aggregations of
cost, based on market prices, are commonly accepted. But they nonetheless can involve difficult
issues of uncertainty, valuation of non-market effects, and aggregation, as discussed below in
relation to benefits.
The climate issue has its own peculiarities, and it is worth putting the benefits question into
context. Thus, exploration of this complex topic begins with a quick survey of the role that
benefits estimates play in long-term strategy development and in the formulation of near-term
3policy. Different issues arise depending on the task—whether it is to inform the setting of a
current level of mitigation effort, to justify a long-term stabilization target, or to provide
information about possible regional effects and guidance for adaptive measures. A summary
will follow of limits to our ability to develop commonly accepted, comprehensive measures of
climate benefits. Based on the view thus laid out, insights will be drawn about the possible
development of a framework for summarizing and presenting benefits information, and the
research needed to support it.
2. THE ROLE OF BENEFIT ESTIMATES IN POLICY FORMATION
Projections of the economic and environmental effects of climate change see a wide range of
uses in the policy process. These include the presentation of dramatic pictures of specific events
(endangered polar bears, shriveled crops) intended to stir public interest in the issue, and
projections of effects at regional scale to inform public and private managers about opportunities
for effective adaptation. Here, however, the main focus is on the desire for guidance about the
benefits attributable to measures to restrict human emissions and their contribution to global
radiative forcing. Further, it is assumed that a useful “framework” must yield information that is
widely understood and accepted among the diverse set of parties that will participate in
discussions of mitigation efforts, now and in future decades. These include not just members of
the OECD (diverse enough in itself) but also developing countries and economies in transition.
The nature of available benefit (damage) information has an influence on the broad strategy
taken in response to the risk of climate change, and the institutions employed. Such an effect can
be seen in Article 2 to the Climate Convention, discussed below. But the main purpose of any
analysis of benefits and costs of policy is to inform decisions about actions to be taken now.
Nations are limited in their capacity to commit to actions in the distant future. Moreover, the
climate issue is characterized by the stock pollutant character of the greenhouse gases, long lags
in the climate system, and the prospect that some uncertainties will be resolved with time. Under
these conditions, nations will decide and re-decide their global response decade by decade. The
key decision to be informed, then, is what to do in the near term. Discussion of intended actions
over longer time horizons is important, but mainly for what they may imply about desired
activity today.
In this circumstance, benefit information comes into play in policy evaluation at two levels:
directly in guiding near-term mitigation effort, and indirectly as they inform the setting of long-
term goals, which in turn reflect back on the adequacy of efforts today.
2.1 Determining Near-Term Effort
Most often, the benefit side of climate change policy assessments is implicit. Various
categories of climate impacts may be presented, but their integration takes place in the mind of
the observer. Less often, aggregate benefit assessments are made explicit, perhaps including the
4calculation of the marginal value of impacts avoided by mitigation effort today. These latter
studies have a feature in common: in order to identify the desired level of mitigation today, cost
and benefit data are converted to some common measure. Almost universally costs are estimated
in monetary units, as noted earlier, so benefits are similarly expressed. These are then summed
across diverse effects and the various components of the decision unit of interest (e.g., the sector,
the nation, the globe).
In these attempts at explicit analysis, impact estimates usually are summarized by a (net)
damage function, stated in terms of a projected change in global average temperature (e.g.,
Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). Sometimes, an optimal path of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is
computed, along with the associated marginal cost or emissions penalty stated in dollars per ton
of CO2 equivalent. Such analyses typically assume that all future mitigation efforts are carried
out in an optimal manner, considering the estimated costs and benefits of actions along the way.
Usually they are applied at a global level of aggregation, calculating a path of emissions
penalties applying to all nations. Less often such work includes features such as uncertainty and
learning (e.g., Webster, 2002) and differentiation of mitigation effort among countries. Whatever
the method, the main focus of these studies is the optimal level of current effort, and the
associated pattern of stringency in the future.
Later this discussion will return to insights to be drawn from such studies. The observation to
be made at this point is that this explicit benefit-cost framing of policy choice requires agreement
on a single measuring rod, and a means of converting all climate damage effects into these units.
Any individual analyst may do this, of course, and draw insight from the results. The difficulty
arises in attempts to achieve agreement among nations and interest groups on a common version
of this procedure and its underlying values. The problem is illustrated by the IPCC summary of
estimates of the proper current (late 1990s) marginal benefit of GHG abatement. The IPCC
found a range of $1.40 to $35 per ton CO2 (Pierce et al., 1996).
2.2 Setting Long-Term Goals
Perhaps anticipating the difficulty of direct estimation of the benefits of GHG mitigation, the
objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was framed (in its Article 2)
not as seeking a socially beneficial mix of mitigation and adaptation over time but as avoiding
“dangerous” levels of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. This formulation directs the policy
debate to a comparison of the advantages of alternative concentration levels compared to the
estimated costs of alternative paths to their achievement. Under any assumed limit on
atmospheric concentrations, such cost-effectiveness analysis leads to recommendations of the
appropriate path of mitigation effort over time and the level of cost—also frequently stated in
terms of dollars per ton CO2 equivalent—that should be paid now (e.g., Wigley, Richels and
Edmonds, 1996; Manne and Richels, 1997).
5Also, Article 2 connects to a provision of Article 4 of the FCCC that requires nations to report
periodically on the adequacy of efforts, and to continue doing so “until the objective of the
Convention is met.” Thus the very notion of an Article 2 target provides a basis for debate about
whether current efforts are consistent with some particular atmospheric goal. This provision has
led to various ways of analyzing what must be done in the short term if an assumed Article 2
goal is to remain within the realm of economic and political feasibility, the most prominent of
these being tolerable windows analysis (Toth et al., 1998).
Underlying the language of Article 2, and the analyses (formal and otherwise) that follow
from it, is the facilitating myth that there exists some scientifically identifiable level of GHG
concentration above which there is “danger,” and below which there is not.1 In the absence of
summary scientific evidence of such a threshold, there emerges a form of meta benefit-cost
assessment about what constitutes the “danger” level, with the debate ranging across levels from
450 ppmv to 750 ppmv.2 Observers who believe that emissions reductions will be cheap, but
climate damage severe, argue that 450 ppmv (or lower) is the correct target. Others who think
mitigation will be costly, but climate benefits questionable, argue against any target lower than
650 ppmv.
One key objective of benefits work, then, is guidance regarding the marginal gains of moving
from a loose to ever more stringent atmospheric targets. Before turning to a summary of the
difficulties underlying this task, it is worth taking a brief look at a couple of recent efforts to
represent the climate damage function—one by the IPCC and the other prepared for this OECD
project. Both use temperature change as the key variable representing climate as it might
influence economies and ecosystems, and each tries to organize available information in a simple
expression or functional form.
The report of Working Group II of the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR) represents a
massive effort, summarizing a huge body of data, research and analysis on the impacts of
potential anthropogenic climate change (McCarthy et al., 2001). One of the tasks of this
Working Group was to help answer the leading question addressed to the TAR: “What can
scientific, technical, and socio-economic analysis contribute to the determination of what
constitutes dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system?” The TAR’s
Synthesis Report states that the IPCC could not produce a coherent answer to the question:
“Comprehensive, quantitative estimates of the benefits of stabilization at various levels of
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases do not yet exist” [emphasis added] (Watson et
al., 2001, p. 22). In part this situation results from uncertainties in the link between atmospheric
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6concentrations and radiative forcing, climate response, etc. But more relevant for this discussion,
the Synthesis Report states,
 . . . impacts such as the changes in the composition and function of ecological
systems, species extinction, and changes in human health, and disparity in the
distribution of impacts across different populations, are not readily expressed in
monetary or other common units.
Nonetheless the authors made an attempt at a summary representation of what is at stake.
Apparently hoping that colors have the same meaning across cultures, they employed the palate in
Figure 1 to express in a qualitative way where “danger” lies. It is a creative attempt to deal with a
daunting problem, but literally the interpretation lies in the eye of the beholder. One conclusion
can safely be drawn from the figure, however. There is in this representation scant guidance for
setting a “danger” threshold for policy purposes, or for estimating a marginal benefit function.
The OECD-sponsored study by Smith and Hitz (2002) draws on analyses reviewed in the
TAR and others published since the TAR was completed. It also makes no attempt at conversion
to a common metric. Instead, the authors seek to reveal the shape of the various damage relations
(e.g., damage increasing monotonically with temperature change, showing first some net benefits
then increasing damages, or unknown), and to identify the level of temperature change where
damages seem to increase significantly. Available studies allow them to so classify some sectors,
but not others.
Figure 1. IPCC Representation of Impacts and Risks of Temperature Change
(Source: McCarthy et al., 2001, Fig. TS-12)
7It is a carefully prepared survey, with studious qualification of its results. But even so there
remains a danger of over-interpretation of its conclusions. One of the key results is that:
Almost all of the studies we examined estimated that there will be increasing damages
beyond approximately 3 to 4°C increase in global mean temperature. The studies do
not show a consistent relationship between impacts and global mean temperature
between 0 and 3 to 4°C. (Smith and Hitz, 2002, p. 54)
When setting an environmental constraint in the face of poorly quantified benefits, it is natural
to look for an “elbow” in the benefits relation. Even if the level of benefits is not known, it is a
good place to consider setting the constraint, because there seems a better chance here than
elsewhere in the possible span of control that marginal benefit (lower below the elbow, higher
above) will intersect the marginal cost of mitigation. The authors do not suggest this interpretation,
but it is there to be made by the unsuspecting reader. Since most sectors covered in the study are
not quantified using a common metric, there is no way to weigh up the relative damage among
sectors. Even if such an “elbow” could be identified within a range of hypothesized temperature
changes, it would vanish with the introduction of uncertainty in the relations of emissions, or even
atmospheric concentrations, to climate outcomes. Thus the survey cannot provide a basis, at an
aggregate level, for saying what the aggregate damage function looks like.
Note should be taken of the severe limits of the studies that were available to Smith and Hitz.
They were very few in number. Also, they tend to use global average temperature as the climate
change indicator, even though in many cases precipitation and dryness, and change in variability
(droughts and floods), may be more important. And most are based on changes in equilibrium
climate, with no capacity to consider the effects of transient change. As emphasized below, any
effort to meet the OECD’s objective of improved benefits estimates should begin with an increased
allocation of resources to the correction of these inadequacies in the fundamental science.
Thus, even after earnest effort, summaries of available climate effects studies offer little
quantitative guidance to global policy setting either for the choice of an atmospheric target or for
the level of near-term effort. There are fundamental reasons why the task of providing better
aggregate benefit estimates will be difficult, if even if the needed work on the underlying science
were available. They are largely evident from the discussion to this point, but it is worth
reviewing three in particular, in order to bolster an argument made later that much of what
governments justifiably want, in the way of scientific information to guide policy development,
is not to be had, at least not in a single “comprehensive, quantitative” measure. It is not just that
such analysis is not available “yet,” as in the quote above from the TAR Synthesis Report. The
need is for a benefits framework that will serve in a world where a single, widely understood and
commonly accepted benefit estimate will not be available ever. This expectation leads to a
portfolio approach, outlined below.
83. THE CHALLENGE OF AGGREGATE BENEFIT ESTIMATION
This essay began with the proposition that, in any policy choice, benefit-cost considerations
are inescapable. Decisions about a climate response—stringent or relaxed policies now, tight or
loose atmospheric constraints for the future—imply some weight of the likely climate benefits.
That argument reflects a view that the concepts and analysis methods of economics, and its sub-
field of welfare economics, provide the best approach to clear thinking about choices in this
domain. Included in this approach is the understanding that value is human mitigated, the
acceptance of notions of willingness to pay as an appropriate basis for economic valuation, and
the parsing of value into different categories (use, option, existence).3 These concepts help
provide a common language, one that is essential for domestic and international debate about an
appropriate response.
The challenge presented by the climate issue is that these ideas must be adapted to choices of
a scope, magnitude, and complexity never foreseen by earlier generations of thinkers. The
underlying economic theory is sound, but severe problems of empirical estimation are revealed
in application to the climate issue, as will be evident in the discussion below. Of course, any one
analyst or analytical group, or perhaps the responsible authorities of one national party to the
Climate Convention, can always agree on benefit estimates, and on a functional form for their
inclusion in a model or other process for deciding mitigation policy. Unfortunately, the task is
not to guide a single decision-maker or interest group but to help inform multiple-nation
negotiations where participants have different understandings of the world, and national
decisions where different segments of the population hold widely varying views of the issue.
3.1 Uncertainty and Risk Preferences
Considered choices about climate policy require the formation of a link between actions that
could be taken and the climate change effects they might prevent. Unfortunately it is a lengthy
chain that connects the two, and the first link is the physics, chemistry and biology of the climate
system and the human and natural systems with which it interacts. Uncertainty in these
phenomena creates serious problems for those trying to construct a measure of the benefits of
efforts to reduce human interference. The difficulty is not just in quantifying the physical4
aspects of climate change, but also in the differences among relevant groups in their perceptions
of the risks that such analysis may reveal.
Informing the choice of an atmospheric concentration target under FCCC Article 2 of the
Climate Convention provides an example of the challenge. At our current level of understanding,
we cannot specify the precise degree of emissions control that would be required to achieve a
particular “danger” level of change, even if such a level could be defined in terms of global
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measures. That is, it refers to impacts stated in their own natural units, and not converted into a monetary measure.
9average temperature. Figure 2, adapted from work by Webster et al. (2003), illustrates the
problem. Shown there are two PDFs of global change. One shows an estimate of the distribution
of temperature change assuming no emissions control, taking account of uncertainty in both
human emissions and the response of the climate system. The other is the same distribution
under a profile of global emissions control that would (under central tendency estimates) lead to
a stabilization of greenhouse gases at roughly 550 ppmv. The insight to be drawn from the figure
is that it is not possible to make a one-to-one link between policy action over time and the
climate change avoided. At best the policy outcome can be stated in terms of a confidence
interval, or the odds that a particular climate result will be achieved.
More troublesome, the need is to pursue the analysis to the regional level, where most of
climate change effects must be studied. Uncertainty grows substantially at regional scale, even
for climate variables such as temperature, precipitation, dryness, etc. One can still think in terms
of the odds of outcomes, but existing climate models cannot even crudely quantify the
uncertainty at regional scale. Finally, even with certain knowledge of future regional climate
conditions, there remain the limits to our knowledge of adaptive response and ultimate impact,
particularly for unmanaged ecosystems. The benefits of an emissions mitigation policy—even
when impacts are measured in their natural units—are thus also most appropriately thought of in
probabilistic terms. Because of the difficulty of uncertainty analysis at regional scale, however,
studies tend to use distant proxies, like global average temperature, and to collapse the analysis
to “reference” values of uncertain emissions and climate system parameters. Nonetheless, there
is no “solution” to be found to the threat of climate change, only the hope of identifying the
appropriate level of risk reduction.
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Furthermore, even where such estimates of the risk-reducing effect of a policy path can be
calculated, the construction of a commonly accepted single benefit function faces another
challenge. Attitudes to risk differ among cultures and across individuals within a culture or
nation (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000; Slovic, 2002). People have different views of what it would
be worth to reduce a particular risk, even if they agree on the magnitude of the effect under
various outcomes. Thus it is difficult to imagine a single benefit function—say, expressing the
benefit of reducing the future atmospheric concentration from 650 to 550 ppmv—that will
communicate across the diverse parties to climate policy negotiations. There may be many ways
to summarize such information, each with meaning to a particular party, but there may be no way
to reach agreement on a common estimate, and perhaps even a difficulty in achieving a common
measuring rod.
3.2 Valuation of Non-Market Impacts
The next link in the chain from mitigation action to benefit would be the conversion of the
many physical, chemical and biological effects into a common measure that can be directly
compared with cost. The issue is valuation, and the task falls into two familiar categories: effects
that can be reasonably represented by calculations using market prices (or near-market analogies)
and those that cannot. Several types of climate impacts can be credibly formulated in monetary
terms, because market prices are available to value the physical changes that may be estimated to
occur. Effects of environmental change on agriculture and commercial forestry are obvious
examples. When prices are not available, valuation can sometimes be achieved by appeal to what
in economic analysis is called the “revealed preference” of consumers—monetary value being
imputed from observed behavior in markets that do exist. Data for such analysis may be found in
closely related markets, as when the value of clean air is estimated from variations in property
values. The value of an environmental bad also may be imputed from expenditure on defensive
measures (sound proofing to avoid noise pollution), or of an environmental good by analysis of
spending that allows full use of the good (travel expenditure to enjoy a park).5
Unfortunately, only a small number of all climate change impacts are candidates for revealed
preference treatment, and the ones where data are available for many countries are still more
limited. Where direct market-origin data are absent, another approach is to apply contingent
valuation—seeking an estimate of what consumers would pay for an environmental good
contingent on the assumption a market existed. A couple of techniques are in use. In one, people
are surveyed to try to determine their willingness to pay for an environmental improvement, or
what they would have to be paid to be willing to accept the loss of some aspect of environmental
quality they already enjoy (Hanemann, 1994). In a similar approach, laboratory experiments are
conducted wherein subjects are put into an artificial market where a non-market good is actually
traded, and behavior is observed in the search for underlying preferences.
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Continuing and sharp controversy surrounds the use of these methods, with serious questions
raised as to whether responses to imaginary situations can ever yield information consistent from
that revealed by real choices (e.g., see Diamond and Hausman, 1994). But whatever one’s taste
in these analytical methods, the scale of the impacts of climate change, and poor respondent
understanding of the implications of changes at regional and global scale, means that any such
applications are going to be partial in coverage. It is hard to imagine the application of such a
process to a relevant question such as, “What would you be willing to pay to prevent the loss of
all arctic tundra?” More important for this discussion, it is questionable whether such
applications can produce estimates that are commensurable across regions or realms of climate
change impact.
3.3 Aggregation
Finally, different participants in the search for a climate solution will add up effects in
different ways, whether expressed in natural units or dollar amounts. The aggregation problem is
the same as that faced in valuing any public good, but it is particularly troublesome in the climate
case. In the classic solution to public goods valuation, benefits are determined by eliciting
estimates of willingness to pay from each party affected, then summing them up. The approach is
consistent in theory; the difficulties arise in practical application. The procedure assumes that the
income distribution underlying the estimates is optimal, or at least acceptable. But in application
to climate change, with its conflict between North and South, this is not the case. The issue was
painfully explored in preparation of the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report, in the debate over
the use of willingness-to-pay measures of the value of human life (Pierce et al., 1996). Without
correction, the same human loss in a rich country receives much greater weight than in poor a
one. There is an extensive literature on the correction of estimates by some form of global
welfare function, with a computation of weights by region, but in the climate context this
approach only pushes the issue back one step to the selection of the weights, for which there is
no widely accepted process. Different parties will have different weighing schemes, and their
summary estimates will be incommensurable.
A further difficulty arises because benefits estimates are not constructed by the textbook
method of summing individual valuations. Rather, analysis groups in one country or another
prepare estimates for the whole, applying willingness-to-pay estimates and relative weights as
they see fit. Even with the best intentions, aggregation methods will differ, and alternative
estimates will be incommensurable for this reason alone. This aggregation issue arises at all
scales from the individual upward to various social aggregates, and in all benefit estimation
problems. But it is particularly troublesome for climate change, which is so fraught with inter-
country equity issues, not to mention the need to aggregate the (imagined) preferences of future
generations.
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4. A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE BENEFIT STUDIES
The conclusion to be drawn from the discussion thus far is that no single benefits measure is
going to be universally applicable.6 By extension, no single method for calculating the magnitude
of the marginal benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation, stated in the same units as marginal costs,
is going to be widely accepted. As a result, there is no single analytical basis for selecting a
target level of atmospheric concentrations or other climate variables like global mean
temperature rise. As in other areas of public decision, governments necessarily face the limits of
neutral assessments as a guide to political decision, and they best prepare to deal with this
situation by structuring benefits research so that the results are transparent, and as universal as
possible in their acceptance.
In this circumstance the desired “framework” for benefits estimation will involve a portfolio
of estimates, related to one another but at different scales, in different units, and with alternative
degrees of aggregation. Discussion of this approach begins with information needed to inform
the debate over long-term atmospheric goals. The proposed set of benefits measures includes
global physical variables, regional indicators in natural units, and monetary aggregates. Their
development involves a set of parallel tasks, because the different indicators need to be
coordinated with one another. Thus while the discussion to follow makes some tentative
recommendations regarding the content of such a portfolio of measures, it should be emphasized
that what is proposed here is best seen as the outline of a research agenda.
4.1 The Selection of Long-Term Atmospheric Goals
A benefits portfolio would include estimates at a global aggregate level, with (1) global
variables that can be analyzed in probabilistic terms, (2) impacts that can be measured at regional
scale—most likely in natural units, and (3) exercises in monetary valuation. With this structure,
variables that might gain broad acceptance are given prominence, and a foundation of common
information is laid for the more problematic matters of non-market valuation and aggregation.
4.1.1 Global Physical Variables, Uncertainty and Risk Reduction
Considering the overwhelming uncertainty that pervades the climate issue, the ideal would be
to formulate climate policy as a way of reducing the risk of damage, in analysis at all levels of
aggregation. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, climate models cannot support this type of analysis
at a regional level. The risk reduction perspective is nonetheless very important to convey, and
thus the first level of benefit representation should be at a global level, expressed in those
variables that can be analyzed in probabilistic terms. Climate variables at this level are usually
thought of as drivers of benefits estimates, but here it is proposed that they themselves serve as
the basis for a benefits measure.
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Several efforts have been made to estimate probability density functions (PDFs) for
temperature change under non-policy conditions (Webster et al., 2003; Wigley and Raper, 2001).
These same analyses can be extended to estimate PDFs of climate change under specified policy
paths, as illustrated by the work of Webster et al. (2003), shown in Figure 2. Such analysis could
be applied to important variables besides global mean temperature, such as temperature by
latitude (e.g., distinguishing risks among polar, temperate and tropical regions) and sea level rise.
Research is needed to better understand which way of representing such results is likely to be
most widely understood by target audiences. Alternatives include PDFs like the ones in Figure 2,
statements of the odds of avoiding certain specific conditions (e.g., sea level rise exceeding
30 cm), or big-loss vs. small-loss segments of roulette wheels. However done, the objective
would be to express the benefits in terms of variables that do not run afoul of the controversies
over valuation and aggregation, and that cast benefits in a proper risk-reduction framework. In
addition, a framework might be provided so that differences in risk perception and tolerance
could at least be discussed.
A question remains as to where in this framework the prospect of abrupt climate change
should be addressed (Alley, 2002; Schneider, 2003). Possible events such as a significant
slowing of the thermohaline circulation, or the loss of permafrost regions and the associated the
release of greenhouse emissions, are too important to be left out of any system. Analyses
attempting to support estimates of likelihood are extremely weak, however, and the potential
effects at regional scale are poorly understood. A tentative recommendation is that they
nonetheless be included in benefit representation at this high level of aggregation, even if stated
only in qualitative terms.
4.1.2 Effects at Regional Scale, In Natural Units
A second component of a benefits portfolio would be measures of impact at regional scale.
In general these measures would be stated in natural units, short of monetary valuation, although
in some cases economic valuation may in fact provide the most convenient measuring rod. For
example, useful market measures have been achieved for sectors like agriculture, commercial
forestry, and energy use, and these monetary measures would be preferred to physical measures.
Here as well the need is for uncertainty analysis, but for the time being estimates at this level
would likely have to be made on an expected magnitude basis. This has been a common
approach among analysts of climate impacts.7
The challenge is to develop a small number of indicators, in natural units, that together
convey as comprehensive a picture as possible of what different levels of climate change might
involve. There are several aspects to the task. First is research on the best regional aggregation
for this purpose. Most studies use an aggregation chosen to be consistent with integrated
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 For example, see Fankhauser (1995), Nordhaus and Boyer (2001), Fussel and van Minnen (2001), and a summary
of work as of 1995 by the IPCC (Pierce et al., 1996).
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assessment models, and so their structure is strongly influenced by the data available for cost
analysis and the assessments at hand for market-price based impacts studies. For example, for
physical indicators (to be discussed below) the identification of polar regions would seem
important, although they are usually missing from such studies.
Next is the identification of physical measures or indices that are mutually consistent (in
terms defined below) and that have high information content. Several examples can be seen in
the papers prepared for this OECD project and in other effects research. A number of studies use
numbers of people subjected to one or another hardship (risk of hunger, flooding, water stress,
disease) as seen the summary by Smith and Hitz (2002). Also, various studies have used
biogeography models to calculate terrestrial impacts measures in terms of pixels where climate
change leads to change in ecotone (Leemans and Eickhout, 2002; Toth, Cramer and Hizsnyik,
2000). In developing a set of such measures, a number of criteria seem important:
• Definition. There should be a clear definition, to allow consistent measurement across
regions.
• Independence. Such measures or indices should be independent of one another, and of
impacts that may be estimated in monetary units at this level of aggregation. The objective
would be to preserve additivity, to facilitate integration with one another and
incorporation in attempts at wide-scale monetary valuation and aggregation.
• Global application. The measure or index should have application to all, or at least most,
regions.
• Baseline comparison. There should be some basis for comparison, so observers have an
idea whether a change is large or small. For example, the measures of change in terrestrial
ecosystems might be calibrated on a regional basis with an estimate of the last 100 years
of anthropogenic change, caused by the conversion of natural ecosystems to agriculture
and urban use.
What is involved here is a stretch toward multi-attribute analysis, and coverage would be partial
at best. Clearly there is no fully satisfactory approach to this task, only more or less
disappointing compromises. But recall the need: it is for indicators at regional level that lie
somewhere in between the color diagram of Figure 1 and a thousand measurements of effects
like hectares of coral reef, numbers of alpine meadows, and days of trout fishing.
4.1.3 Market and Non-Market Valuation and Aggregation
A third component of the portfolio should be the construction of benefit functions, at regional
and global level, aggregated in monetary units. Estimates of this type bring together two rough
categories of analysis and judgment: market and non-market effects. Useful market estimation
has been achieved for several sectors, as noted above. Others, like recreation, have simulated-
market analogies that may prove widely acceptable.8 More problematic are health impacts, where
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economic estimates of pain and suffering and value of human life may be common practice in
some countries and anathema in others. Estimation of effects even further removed from market
measures—like ecosystem change, species loss, and amenity values—present still greater
difficulties, as noted above.
However, despite the difficulties, estimates of monetary aggregates belong in the portfolio of
measures. They are needed to serve two important functions in climate analysis: imposing
discipline on benefit estimates and indicating efficient time patterns of response. On the first
point: without some means of adding up effects—which requires a common measuring rod—it is
difficult limit the claims for one or another physical effect of change, or the mitigation cost
justified to prevent it. Whatever one’s view of the valuation issue, there are tradeoffs to be faced.
The construction of aggregate benefit functions provides a framework for testing the
reasonableness of the total of benefit claims, including a transparent accounting of possible
substitutes for good and services, or environmental conditions, that may be lost or displaced due
to climate change.
The second advantage is the insights to be gained about climate policy, even if no more than
the general shape of a global benefit function is accepted. A number of studies impose a benefit
function that presumes that climate damage increases more than proportionally to temperature
change. Some of these applications calibrate these relations with benefit estimates from
individual sectors and countries (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). The procedure is subject to
question given the concerns summarized above, but the precise parameters are not crucial to the
essential insight to be drawn from these studies. It is that, for climate change, an efficient
mitigation response will start small and increase in stringency over time. The precise level of
current effort may still be left unresolved, but the nature of the desired path is not, and it is an
insight missing from much current climate discussion and policymaking.
4.2 Informing Short-Term Effort
If the analysis is extended to the benefits that can be attributed to action taken today (the most
important issue at stake), additional considerations and uncertainties intrude. The effects on
climate risk of actions taken today are not independent of what future generations of policymakers
may decide to do along the way. As noted already, many calculations of desired near-term effort
are based on the assumption that all future generations will make choices that are socially optimal
given the assumed cost and benefit functions (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, 2001). Even those
calculating the minimal effort required now to keep open the option of meeting of some future
goal (e.g., Toth et al., 1998) must impose assumptions about future behavior. Further complicating
the analysis of these choices at each step is the fact that the options that future decision makers
will face are influenced by actions of their predecessors. Today’s actions influence not only the
available set of future technological options, but also the inheritance of institutional capability
and public understanding. Thus, except where analysis can be based on a single monetary benefit
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function, or the benefit analysis yields an atmospheric constraint, the distance between estimates
of climate change effect and the choices made today is great. The condition is, unfortunately,
characteristic of a stock pollutant emitted by many sources, and the direct guidance to political
decisions about current mitigation effort is at best indirect.
5. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Most of the components of a framework for benefit estimation, at least as discussed here, are
not new. Work is under way on almost every topic, building on years of research and analysis
stimulated by the climate change issue. A couple of points from the discussion above should be
emphasized however. First, what is suggested here is a more formal structuring of climate effects
estimates according to region and the level of detail. The objective is to provide a portfolio of
information that can be further analyzed and aggregated according to the abilities and values of
the various participants in climate policy discussions.9 Second, the development of such a structure
is a research task—requiring a focusing of effort and redirection of available resources to climate
change impacts and the benefits of emissions mitigation. The overriding priority in meeting these
needs is research on the fundamental science of climate change impacts, with a special focus on
natural ecosystems, their ability to adapt, and potential damage when they cannot. The discussion
above, and the survey by Smith and Hitz (2002) highlight the inadequacy of current knowledge.
In part the lack is attributable to the great complexity of these systems, but unfortunately our
ignorance also results from the inadequate allocation of funds to research in these areas by the
major national and regional research organizations. Most of the other specific tasks suggested
below depend on progress on the basic science of terrestrial and ocean ecosystems.
If the portfolio concept emphasized here is to be pursued, several other areas of research are
of high priority. Climate change is a century-scale problem, and by the same token the
development of a limited portfolio of measures, to help inform the policy process, should be seen
as requiring continuous, long-term effort as well. The needed actions include the following.
Design of a Portfolio Benefits Measures. Based on analysis of available information and a
forecast of the possible results of future research, a template should be designed, covering
the three elements of the portfolio above. It should consist of a limited set of
indicators—no more than ten. This might include two or three measures of global climate
(e.g., probability of temperature rise greater than 2°C by 2100), four or five summary
indicators of regional impact, and one global monetary measure. The portfolio of
measures would not be the only information generated and made available, but it would be
a set of variables continuously maintained and used to describe the results of various
policy choices.
Encouragement of Uncertainty Analysis. Analysis of uncertainty in climate projections,
and in the effects of policy measures, is being pursued, as noted above. These efforts
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 There are limits to this approach, of course. If key parties are poles apart in their view of the nature of climate risk,
then even a minimal portfolio of commonly shared information may be difficult to achieve.
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should be encouraged, and supported where possible. Also, a process for incorporating
this work into benefits measures at the level of global climate should be developed,
perhaps including involvement of the IPCC.
Development of Regional Impact Indicators. A research program should be formulated
with the purpose of developing the best set of impacts indicators (which may include
market measures) that can be supported by current research and anticipated future results.
The work would involve a process of sorting and testing, using the criteria proposed
above, in a search for a set of indicators that captures as many of the implications of
change as possible without causing sensory overload.
Estimation of Market Impacts in Developing Countries. Most analyses of the market
effects of climate change have been carried out in the richer countries, and very crude
methods have been applied to extend the results to the developing world. Research
directed specifically at impacts in developing countries should be increased, in order to fill
out those regional indicators where monetary quantities are a natural unit of measure.
Particularly important in such an effort will be consideration of potential improvements
over time in adaptive capacity.
Formulation of Global Climate Damage Functions. Global damage functions are an
essential input to many forms of analysis applied to the climate issue. Yet the number of
efforts to prepare such estimates is very small. Moreover, they focus very heavily on
available market-based estimates, with minimal research on ways of incorporating effects
on unmanaged ecosystems. Research should be supported to improve these aggregate
functions, particularly the representation of developing country impacts and the
consideration of non-market, ecosystem effects.
Finally, one message of this exploration of the benefits question is that policymakers can
reasonably expect benefits work to yield insight into the seriousness of climate change, and
rough guidance as to actions that are justified today and leading into the future, but they cannot
expect the problem of incommensurability of benefit estimates to be overcome. Clear, widely
accepted estimates of marginal benefits are not likely to become available to dramatically narrow
the range of choices regarding what to do today. They must prepare as best they can for
extracting a basis for judgment from a (one hopes well-constructed) framework for summarizing
diverse forms of information.
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